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that his fleet was so powerful that he
could divide it and still sustain local su-
periority. However, because Mahan
never considered a situation such as
this, one must judge him inadequate as
a guide in the last year of the great
Pacific War.
“No plan survives first major contact
with the enemy,” wrote Helmut von
Moltke the Elder, chief of the German
General Staff in the mid-nineteenth
century. If this be true of plans, which
are far less abstract than theories,
should one expect that Mahan provides
adequate direction through all the con-
tingencies that a warrior might face?
MICHAEL PEARLMAN
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(Retired)
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Roger Parkinson’s study of the Royal
Navy from 1878 to the 1890s provides a
useful overview of a period in British
naval history that is sometimes seen as a
neglected “Dark Age.” He takes issue
with the standard work of the period,
Arthur Marder’s first book, British Na-
val Policy, 1880–1905: The Anatomy of
British Sea-Power (1940). In this pub-
lished version of his University of
Exeter doctoral thesis completed under
Dr. Michael Duffy, Parkinson expands
on the insights of Oscar Parkes, Bryan
Ranft, Donald M. Schurman, Paul M.
Kennedy, N. A. M. Rodger, Jon T.
Sumida, and John Beeler with his own
detailed research work in parliamentary
papers, the Admiralty and Cabinet
Office files at the National Archives,
Kew, and the private papers of Lord
Salisbury, Britain’s prime minister in
1885, 1886–92, 1895–1902, at Hatfield
House.
Parkinson’s central focus is on the
background and the effect of Britain’s
Naval Defence Act of 1889 in the period
that has come to be called––and even
dismissed as––the “pre-Dreadnought”
era. He is reported to be preparing a
follow-up work that will focus on the
era of HMS Dreadnought from 1906 on-
ward. In the volume at hand, Parkinson
argues that most historians of the pe-
riod have accepted too easily Arthur
Marder’s picture of Britain’s relative
naval weakness in comparison with
other European naval powers. In partic-
ular, Parkinson shows that Britain was
not by any means a weak naval power
and that W. T. Stead’s famous articles
in the Pall Mall Gazette of 1884 were
based on a gross exaggeration of the ac-
tual state of affairs. The key consider-
ation, he points out, was maintaining a
naval force that was equal to that of the
next two largest naval powers, France
and Russia. The effort to maintain that
margin of supremacy in terms of naval
expenditures, tonnage, and warship
numbers resulted in the Naval Defense
Act in 1889. Parkinson maintains this
was the spark that ignited the naval race
that lasted until the Washington naval
arms-limitation treaty of 1922. As a re-
sult, Britain’s strategic situation
changed from one that was a relatively
stable balance between Britain facing
France and Russia up to the 1880s to
one of the late 1890s and early twenti-
eth century that became a “strategic
melting pot with not three but eight
major naval powers––Britain, France,
Russia, America, Germany, Japan, Italy,
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and Austria-Hungary.” The instigation
of this naval arms race, Parkinson con-
cludes, was the consistent overreaction
in Britain that resulted in the 1889 Na-
val Act due to the influence on naval
policy and strategy by the Royal Navy’s
“Young Turks” and panic mongers––
W. H. Hall, C. C. P. Fitzgerald, and
Lord Charles Beresford, abetted by
leading writers like the Colomb broth-
ers and the historian John Knox
Laughton, all of whom were
encouraged by older admirals such as
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thomas
Symonds and Sir Geoffrey
Phipps-Hornby.
In reaching these conclusions, Parkin-
son makes a useful contribution to
scholarship, and his original research in
British archives clearly sets his work in
the context of recent writings by other
scholars of British naval history on this
period. The weakness of his work lies in
his complete reliance on older, and of-
ten outdated, secondary works for his
chapter sections on competing navies,
such as the U.S. Navy, and the presence
in his sources of little, if anything, that
is not English on the Latin American
navies or on those of France, Germany,
and Russia. While readers may lament
these weaknesses, Parkinson’s book is,
nevertheless, an important and stimu-
lating contribution to the history of the
late Victorian navy.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College
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